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Abstract 
 
In Europe, the past twenty years saw a process of liberalisation, deregulation and unprecedented 
financial sector reform whose main aims were to increase competition and remove all remaining 
barriers to the integration of EU banking sectors. However, the recent acceleration in the 
consolidation process has raised concerns about the potential implications for public policies 
deriving from increased market power. Using bank level balance sheet data for commercial banks in 
the major EU banking markets, this paper aims to shed some light on the recent developments in 
competition, concentration and bank-specific efficiency levels. Furthermore, using a Granger-type 
causality test estimations this study aims to investigate the relationship between competition and 
efficiency in banking markets. Our findings suggest a negative causation between efficiency and 
competition, whereas the causality running from competition to efficiency, although positive, is 
relatively weak.  
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Does Competition Lead to Efficiency?  
The Case of EU Commercial Banks 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Competition is generally accepted as a positive force in most industries; it is supposed to have a 
positive impact on an industry’s efficiency, quality of provision, innovation and international 
competitiveness. However, the issue of competition in banking has always been controversial, as 
the perceived benefits from increased competition have to be weighted against the risks of potential 
instability. As a consequence, the banking industry has been historically heavily regulated. 
Furthermore, the existence of frictions in banking markets (for example, the existence of entry 
barriers and asymmetric information) causes the welfare theorems associated with perfect 
competitions not to be directly applicable to banking and allows room for the exercise of market 
power (Vives, 2001). Nevertheless, a healthy degree of rivalry is considered necessary for the 
dynamic efficiency of an industry and this principle is at the basis of the trend towards fostering 
greater competition in banking markets all over the world. 
 
The past twenty years saw a process of liberalisation, deregulation and unprecedented financial 
sector reform both in developing and developed countries. In the European Union, the aim of 
regulatory developments, which include movements towards the creation of a single market for 
financial services, was to foster competition in order to improve the productivity, efficiency and 
profitability of the banking systems and also to increase both national and international 
competitiveness. The European Commission (EC), in its recent White Paper on Financial Services 
Policy (2005-2010) has stated that its principal objectives include: “To consolidate dynamically 
towards an integrated, open, inclusive, competitive, and economically efficient EU financial market 
and to remove the remaining economically significant barriers so financial services can be 
provided and capital can circulate freely throughout the EU at the lowest possible cost…” 
(SEC(2005) 1574). The EC believes that the aim of increased financial integration has been driven 
forward by the success of the Financial Services Action Plan 1999-2005 (FSAP), resulting in 
improvements in the financial industry’s overall performance: higher liquidity, increased 
competition, sound profitability and stronger financial stability. The EC is also keen to further 
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enhance competition to encourage additional consolidation and to boost the efficiency of pan-
European financial markets.  
 
Banks responded to the new operating environment by adapting their strategies, seeking new 
distribution channels and changing their organisational structures. Increased competition has also 
been considered the main driving force behind the acceleration in the recent consolidation process; 
which is raising concerns about increased concentration in the banking sector and its potential 
implications for public policy. The aggregate number of credit institutions continued declining, 
confirming the trend of market consolidation. At the end of 2005, there were 8,684 institutions 
representing a decrease of 10.9% relative to 2001. Consolidation has proceeded even faster in the 
euro area with a decrease of 12.5% since 2001 (ECB, 2006). In past years, concentration operations 
in the EU banking sector have been predominantly of a domestic nature. Between 1993 and 2003, 
the number of mergers and acquisitions involving domestic credit institutions represented about 
80% of total consolidation activity in the EU (Walkner and Raes, 2005). However, the pace of 
domestic consolidation has recently slowed down, whereas the value of cross-border bank M&A 
has been rising, reaching record levels in 2005. EU-wide consolidation has been under way for 
some time: since the mid-1990s European banks have spent €158bn on 274 cross-border M&A 
deals, involving other European banks (for example, HSBC and Credit Commercial de France, 
Barclays’ acquisition of Banco Zaragozano, Unicredit’s acquisition of HVB and BSCH acquisition 
of Abbey, ABN-AMBRO and Banca Antonveneta) and there are reasons to believe the trend will 
gather pace (PWC, 2006). The degree of concentration of EU banking systems continues to rise: in 
the period 2000-2005 the five largest credit institutions increased their share of total assets from 
37.8% to 42.3% in the EU (from 39.1% to 43% in the euro area) (ECB, 2006). 
 
However, the impact of consolidation on banking-sector performance remains controversial (see 
Amel et al., 2004). In particular, the debate on the competition and market power effects of bank 
concentration and their relationship with profitability and efficiency issues has raised great interest 
among academics, policy-makers and anti-trust authorities. Policymakers are faced with the 
contrasting issues as to whether competitive forces are posing a threat for the sector stability or 
whether the consolidation wave poses a threat to competition in the sector.   Indeed, these issues are 
highly interrelated and often intertwined and, given the unique role of banks in the economy and the 
potential non-trivial implications for welfare, they deserve special attention.  
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The study of bank competition and its effect on the concentration, efficiency, profitability and, 
indirectly, stability of the EU banking sector is therefore of relevance in a period of renewed 
regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers and of increased domestic and cross-border 
M&As. This paper aims to investigate the dynamics of both competition and efficiency in EU 
banking markets since the year 2000. Concentrating on the commercial banking sector of the five 
main EU banking markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), this study evaluates cost 
efficiency using both parametric (SFA) and non parametric (DEA) approaches. We test the degree 
of competition by using both structural (concentration ratios, Herfindhal Hirshman Index) and non-
structural methods, the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic and the Lerner Index. Furthermore, using dynamic 
panel data Granger-type causality test estimations, this study aims to investigate the relationship 
between competition and efficiency in banking markets. Whereas a positive relationship between 
competition and efficiency is often assumed, the specific characteristics of banking markets (i.e. 
entry barriers, sunk costs, information asymmetries) may lead to excessive market power of 
efficient banks, therefore reducing competition. Our findings suggest a negative causation between 
efficiency and competition, whereas the causality running from competition to efficiency, although 
positive, is relatively weak. These results pose further questions for European regulators, as they 
might be faced by a trade-off between competition and efficiency.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature on 
competition and efficiency in banking. Section 3 describes data and empirical methods used. 
Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Competition and Efficiency in European Banking 
Over the past twenty years, the deregulation and market integration processes, coupled with 
advances in information technologies, have been a steady feature of EU banking markets and have 
given way to a profound transformation and restructuring of the banking industry, which 
materialised in enhanced consolidation and a move away from the traditional intermediation 
business into more profitable investment services. The analysis of the relationship connecting 
deregulation, market enlargement, competition, consolidation, profitability and efficiency is one of 
relevance to researchers and policymakers. The issue of competition has been widely researched in 
the industrial organisation literature from the 1980s onwards, evolving mainly in two directions: the 
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structural and non-structural approaches. Traditional industrial organisation theory focuses of the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. Market structure is reflected in concentration 
ratios for the largest firms (CR ratios) and the Hirschman Herfindhal index (HH). This literature is 
essentially based on the assumption that concentration weakens competition by fostering collusive 
behaviour among firms (the so-called “collusion hypothesis”). Increased market concentration was 
found to be associated with higher prices and greater than normal profits (Bain, 1951). Smirlock 
(1985) and Evanoff and Fortier (1988) argue that higher profits in concentrated markets could be 
the result of greater productive efficiency. The existence of a link between market structure and 
efficiency was first proposed by Hicks (1935) and the quiet life hypothesis. Hicks (1935) argued 
that monopoly power allows managers a quiet life free from competition and therefore increased 
concentration should bring about a decrease in efficiency. Liebenstein (1966) argues that 
inefficiencies are reduced by increased competition as managers respond to the challenge. The 
efficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1974) on the other hand, posits a reverse causality between 
competition and efficiency. According to the efficient structure hypothesis, more efficient firms 
have lower costs, which in turn lead to higher profits. Therefore, the most efficient firms are able to 
increase their market share, resulting in higher concentration. Firms may be exploiting greater X-
efficiency (the so-called “efficiency hypothesis”) or greater scale efficiency (the so-called “scale 
efficiency hypothesis”). Given that higher market concentration lowers competition, according to 
the efficiency hypothesis there should be an inverse relationship between competition and 
efficiency, thus reversing the causality running from efficiency to competition in the SCP paradigm. 
Berger (1995) finds some evidence that the efficiency hypothesis holds in US banking. In Europe, 
on the other hand, structural factors appear to be more important and the SCP hypothesis seems to 
hold (Goddard et al., 2001). However, the debate “collusion” versus “efficiency” has not yet been 
satisfactorily resolved (Goddard et al., 2007).  
 
The non-structural approach, on the other hand, posits that factors other than market structure and 
concentration may affect competitive behaviour, such as entry/exit barriers and the general 
contestability of the market (Baumol et al. 1982; Bresnahan, 1989; Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar 
and Rosse, 1987). These latter approaches have been developed in the context of the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. While tests of market power carried out employing the 
traditional SCP approach (and recent variations of it), observe the structure of the market (e.g. 
concentration levels, number of firms) and relate this to the conduct (e.g. pricing policies) and 
performance (e.g. ROA, ROE) of firms; in non-structural approaches empirical studies do not 
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observe the competitive environment but they attempt to measure/infer it. Probably the most 
important advantage of non-structural approaches is that it cannot be assumed a priori that 
concentrated markets are not competitive because contestability may depend on the extent of 
potential competition and not necessarily on market structure. Another advantage of non-structural 
models is that there is no need to specify a geographic market, since the behaviour of individual 
banks gives an indication of their market power. Non-structural measures of competition are mainly 
based on the Lerner (1934) measure of monopoly power. Specifically, they include measures of 
competition between oligopolists (Iwata, 1974) and those that test for the competitive conditions in 
contestable markets (Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). Several recent 
empirical applications point to the need of a structural contestability approach when studying the 
degree of competitiveness in the banking industry (see Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Relatively 
new research warns that bank size and types may affect competitiveness differently and that using 
only one measure may not be sufficient for inferring on the true degree of competition (Berger et 
al., 2004).  
 
Both the SCP and the NEIO are based on static models of competitive equilibrium. On the other 
hand, the persistence of profit (POP) hypothesis (Mueller, 1977, 1986) posits that if entry and exit 
are sufficiently free, it would quickly eliminate any abnormal profit and all firms’ profits would 
tend to converge toward the same long run average. However, if abnormal profits tend to persists 
from year to year, then there might be barriers to entry or banks might be exploiting monopoly 
power. 
 
There is a vast literature on the measurement of cost structure and efficiency in banking and on the 
determinants of efficiency. The early bank efficiency literature shows that before deregulation 
banking markets were often characterised by the presence of many institutions operating at a non-
optimal scale with relatively high excess capacity (see the reviews by Berger and Humphrey, 1997 
and Goddard et al., 2001). Such banks could survive mainly because of the lack of competitive 
pressures and the fact that, in some cases, the domestic authorities, while acting as protectors of 
their banking sectors, were keen on maintaining a large number of banks in their systems. With 
deregulation and higher competition, the process of concentration accelerated so that banks could 
operate at a better (and more efficient) scale that allowed them to earn higher profits. In some cases, 
takeovers could even be considered as a ‘natural outcome’ of a competitive game that had positive 
externalities because it could prevent the failure of significantly inefficient banks (Grillo, 2005). As 
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a result of such ‘dynamic’ competition, the correlation between bank-specific profitability and 
efficiency should be positive, although higher concentration levels in the banking sector could 
subsequently limit the welfare gains through the loss in competition. Indeed a more static approach 
to competition suggests that banks operating in a concentrated market may be induced to use their 
market power to gain extra profits in an attempt to offset the inefficiencies derived by the lack of 
competitive pressures. Here the correlation between profitability and efficiency should be either 
zero or negative because less efficient banks with more market power will be able to gain extra 
profits. If we refer to the extant efficiency literature, banks typically encounter relatively large scale 
diseconomies once they exceed a certain ‘optimal’ size (Amel et al., 2004). Similarly, the corporate 
finance literature suggests that on average bank M&As do not offer improvements in either 
efficiency measures or better stock market returns. While evidence of efficiency gains within banks 
that have consolidated is not clear-cut, a number of analyses suggest that banking consolidation 
tends to increase customer welfare by improving lending rates and credit access for borrowers, as 
well as – in the longer run – raising deposit rates (Grillo, 2005).  
 
Only a handful of studies directly address the issue of the relationship between the intensity of 
competition and efficiency. It was expected that increased competition would in turn foster 
efficiency by providing incentives to managers to cut costs in order to remain profitable. Recent 
research has however indicated that the relationship between competition and banking system 
performance is more complex and that the view that competition is unambiguously good is more 
naïve in banking than in other industries (Claessen and Leaven, 2004). The empirical evidence on 
the links between concentration and banking sector efficiency does not suggest an unambiguously 
positive – or negative – relationship (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2000). Furthermore, there are 
conflicting results on the impact of increased bank concentration – through M&As – on efficiency, 
deposit rates and bank profitability (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Pilloff, 1996). Based on European 
banking data, Casu and Girardone (2006) and Weill (2005) find an inverse relationship between 
competition and efficiency. They find little evidence that banking system concentration negatively 
relate to competitiveness but suggest that the most efficient banking systems are also the least 
competitive. It may be the case that larger size banks have been able to cut cost, exploit both 
economies of scale and X-efficiencies, and achieve a degree of market power in their local markets, 
therefore increasing both prices and profits. This may indicate that that the pro-competitive 
deregulation of the EU banking markets might have led to increased market power for the most 
efficient banks, therefore lowering the pressures initially resulting from increased competition. 
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This study contributes to the literature both by extending the analysis of the relationship between 
bank competition, concentration and efficiency to a cross-section of countries and by testing the 
direction of the causal relationship between competition and efficiency. In a bi-variate framework, 
the first variable is said to cause the second variable in the Granger sense if the forecast for the 
second variable improves when lagged values for the first variable are taken into account (Granger, 
1969). Though originally designed for pairs of lengthy time series, Granger tests are increasingly 
used to evaluate causal relationships in panel data. The extension of the original Granger 
methodology to panel data has the potential to improve upon the conventional Granger analysis for 
all of the reasons that panel analysis is generally preferable to cross-sectional or traditional time 
series analysis (see Greene, 2003). The introduction of a panel data dimension permits the use of 
both cross-sectional and time-series information to test any causality relationships between two 
variables. In this paper, we employ dynamic panel data methods; specifically we use the 
‘difference’ and ‘system’ (or ‘combined’) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedures 
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Our findings suggest that in the majority of cases the Granger coefficient 
is negative, thereby indicating that cost efficiency negatively Granger-causes competition (i.e. an 
increase in bank efficiency Granger-causes a decrease in competition). On the other hand, the 
causality running from competition to efficiency, although positive, is relatively weak. These results 
pose additional questions for competition policies. Regulatory initiatives aimed at further enhancing 
competition in EU banking should be aware of its possible adverse effects on efficiency. Decreases 
in bank efficiency can either be a signal that banks are struggling under excessive competition, with 
serious implications for the sector stability, or that they are reacting to competition by increased 
market power. Indeed, market power, as Vives (2002) points out, could be beneficial in banking as 
it provides incentives for banks to undertake less risky strategies. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 NEIO Measures of Competition: H-statistics and Lerner Index 
The H-statistics and Lerner Index are non-structural indicators of the degree of market competition 
that were developed in the context of the NEIO (e.g. Iwata, 1974; Baumol et al. 1982; Bresnahan, 
1989; Rosse and Panzar, 1977; Panzar and Rosse, 1987). The H-statistics (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) 
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is calculated using a reduced form revenue equation and measures the sum of elasticities of total 
revenue of the firm with respect to the firm’s input prices as follows:  
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where Ri refers to revenues of bank i (* indicates equilibrium values) and wi is a vector of m factor 
input prices of bank i. Market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input 
prices kiw∂   is reflected in the equilibrium revenues *iR∂ earned by bank i.  
Inputs and outputs are defined using Sealey and Lindley (1977)’s intermediation approach as 
follows: deposits, labour and capital are inputs to the production process of banks while total loans 
and securities are outputs. A fixed effects panel data model is run to estimate the following reduced 
form revenue equation in order to derive the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic: 
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for t=1,…T, where T is the number of periods observed and i=1,…I, where I is the total number of 
banks. Subscripts i and t refer to bank i at the time t. The dependent variable is lnTR, which is total 
revenue over total assets and thus accounts for both the banks’ interest- and non-interest income. 
The variable is divided by total assets in order to account for size differences. Consistently with the 
intermediation approach, we assume that banks use three inputs, labour, deposits and capital. lnP1 is 
the average cost of labour (personnel expenses/total assets); lnP2 is the average cost of deposits 
(interest expenses/customer and short-term funding); and lnP3 the average cost of capital (total 
capital expenses/total fixed assets).  The equation also includes a set of explanatory variables which 
reflect differences in costs, size, risk, structure and product mix and which should, in theory, stem 
from the cost and revenue functions underlying the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics. The bank specific 
control variables include: lnEQAST which is the ratio of total equity to total assets; lnAST is total 
assets; lnLOANAST is the ratio of total loans to total assets; lnDEP is the ratio of total deposit over 
total deposits and money market funding; lnOBSAST is equal OBS activities over total assets. All 
variables are in logarithmic form.  
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As mentioned earlier, the H-statistics measures the sum of the elasticities of banks’ total revenue 
with respect to input prices.1 Hence, it is calculated as the sum of the input prices coefficients β1 to 
β3 as shown in equation (3): 
 
 ∑
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1
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where j=1,…J, and J is the number of inputs included in the calculations. The Panzar-Rosse H-
statistics is interpreted as follows: H is equal to zero or negative when the competitive structure is a 
monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly. When H is equal to 1, it indicates perfect competition and 
0<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition. H can be interpreted as a continuous measure of the level of 
competition, in particular between 0 and 1, in the sense that higher values of H indicate stronger 
competition than lower values (see e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2000; Goddard et al. 2001; Casu and 
Girardone, 2006).  
 
The Lerner index of monopoly power measures the mark-up of bank output prices over the 
marginal cost of production and can be approximated empirically using the translog functional form 
with three inputs and a single output:2 
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where TC is total costs; Q is total assets; P1 is the price of labour; P2 is the price of deposits and P3 
is the price of capital; T  is a time trend; α, β, δ, γ, ρ, t, θ, ψ  are parameters to be estimated; and ε  
is the error term.3 The cost function is estimated using a common frontier and allows the derivation 
of marginal costs (MC) as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 The model is based on a general banking market model where the equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of 
banks are determined by profit maximisation at both the bank and the industry level (see for more details on the 
derivation of the H-statistics Bikker and Haaf, 2002: 2193-2194 and Bikker, 2004:85-86). 
2 For the theoretical derivation of the Lerner index, see e.g. Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005). 
3 We apply the common restrictions of standard symmetry and homogeneity in prices to the translog functional form. 
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Marginal costs derived from equation (5) are used to calculate the Lerner index: 
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where pi  the price of production output Q total assets and is calculated as total revenue (interest 
plus non-interest income) divided by total assets. LERNER=0 it indicates perfect competition, 
while LERNER=1 indicates monopoly.  
 
 
 
3.2 Frontier Efficiency Analysis 
The literature on the measurement of efficiency frontiers can be divided in two main streams: 
parametric techniques, such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and non-parametric 
techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
 
The standard SFA generates estimates of X-efficiencies for each banking institution along the lines 
first suggested by Aigner et al. (1977). Specifically, X-efficiency scores are estimated using the 
Battese and Coelli’s (1992) time-varying stochastic frontier approach for panel data with firm 
effects which are assumed to be distributed as truncated normal random variables and are also 
permitted to vary systematically with time (see also Battese and Coelli, 1993; and Coelli et al., 
1998). The chosen functional form for the cost function is the translog as specified in equation (4) 
above with the same three inputs, but with two outputs (total loans and total securities) and a time 
trend. The final specification is as follows: 
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The single-equation stochastic cost model is represented by itjtitit BPQTCTC ε+= );,(lnln *  where 
the variables are defined as above (equation 4, Section 3.1) and B is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. Finally εit is a two-components error term that for the i-th firm that can 
be written as follows: ititit vu +=ε  where itv is a two-sided error term capturing the effects of 
statistical noise, assumed to be independently and identically normal distributed with zero mean and 
variance 2vσ  and independent of the )]}(exp[{ Ttnuu iit −−= where iu is a one-sided error term 
capturing the effects of inefficiency and assumed to be half normally distributed with mean zero 
and variance 2uσ ; n is an unknown parameter to be estimated capturing the effect of inefficiency 
change over time.  
 
On the other hand, DEA is a mathematical linear programming technique developed by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (CCR) which identifies the efficient frontier from the linear 
combination of those units/observations that (in a production space) use comparatively less inputs 
to produce comparatively more outputs. In particular, if N firms use a vector of inputs to produce a 
vector of outputs, the input-oriented CCR measure of efficiency of a particular firm is calculated as: 
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where  iθ 1≤  is the scalar efficiency score for the i-th unit. If iθ =1 the i-th firm is efficient as it lies 
on the frontier, whereas if iθ < 1 the firm is inefficient and needs a (1- iθ ) reduction in the inputs 
levels to reach the frontier. 
 
The CCR model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), which is the optimal scale in the long-
run. The additional convexity constraint ∑ = 1iλ   can be included in (8) to allow for variable 
returns to scale (VRS) (see Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) or BCC model The BCC model is 
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used in this paper since several factors such as imperfect competition and regulatory requirements 
may cause a unit not to be operating at the optimal scale.4 
 
Choosing the appropriate definition of bank output is a relevant issue for research into banks’ cost 
efficiency. The approach to output definition used in this study is a variation of the intermediation 
approach, which was originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and posits that total loans 
and securities are outputs, whereas deposits along with labour and physical capital are inputs. 
Specifically, the input variable used in this study is Total Costs (Personnel Expenses + Other 
Administrative Expenses + Interest Paid + Non-Interest Expenses) whereas the output variables 
capture both the traditional lending activity of banks (total loans) and the growing non-lending 
activities (other earning assets). 
 
 
 
3.3 Dynamic Panel Data Granger-Type Causality estimation 
Granger testing is a common method of investigating causal relationships (Granger, 1969) by 
estimating an equation in which y is regressed on lagged values of y and the lagged values of an 
additional variable x. The null hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y. If one or more of the 
lagged values of x is significant, we are able to reject the null hypothesis and we can conclude that x 
Granger causes y. Though imperfect, it is a standard and useful tool for evaluating the character of 
the causal relationship between two variables. The test was originally designed for pairs of lengthy 
time series; however, econometricians have recently begun to modify Granger tests to incorporate 
panel dynamics (see for example Arellano and Bond 1991; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988; Hurlin 2005; 
and Hurlin and Venet 2001). 
 
In this study, in order to statistically test the Granger causality between efficiency and competition 
we employ dynamic panel data methods. Specifically we use the ‘difference’ and ‘system’ (or 
‘combined’) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedures developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
These methods are useful for panels characterised by a relatively low number of years and a large 
                                                 
4 For an introduction to DEA methodology see, among others, Coelli et al. (1998); Thanassoulis (2001); see 
Thanassoulis (2007) for an extensive review of this literature. 
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number of cross-sections per year and help deal with possible problems of endogeneity and 
measurement error. 
 
The single equation to be estimated is an autoregressive-distributed linear specification as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) itit
n
j
jtij
n
j
jtijit xyy υηθβαα +++++= ∑∑
=
−
=
−
11
0     (9) 
 
where ity  is the dependent variable, 0α  is the intercept, ( )jtiy − is jth lag of the dependent 
variable, ( )jtix − is jth lag of an explanatory variable of interest, jα and jβ  are parameters to be 
estimated, tθ  is a common time effect, iη is an individual bank specific effect, and itυ is a 
disturbance term. Specifically, the following AR(2) model has been found appropriate for this 
application: 
 
itittitititiit xxyyy υηθββααα +++++++= −−−− 2,21,12,21,10    (10) 
 
Since we expect causality to run in either direction, ity  and itx  are represented alternatively by a 
measure of competition (the Lerner Index of monopoly power) and a measure of bank cost 
efficiency (estimated using parametric and non-parametric methods). This will allow us to 
investigate in a six-year dataset for five EU countries whether changes in competition patterns 
precede (Granger-cause) changes in bank efficiency, and/or vice-versa whether changes in 
efficiency Granger-cause changes in competition.  
 
We first run pooled OLS and fixed and random effects regressions. The limitations of these models 
when estimating equations similar to (9) above are well described in e.g. Bond (2002) and 
Roodman (2006). We then employ the so-called “difference” GMM (DIF-GMM) estimator 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for the coefficients in equation (10) where the lagged 
levels of the regressors are instruments for the equation in first differences. The so-called 
“difference” GMM (DIF-GMM) estimator relies upon the following moment conditions:5 
 
                                                 
5 Arellano and Bond (1991) derive the moment conditions for AR(1) and AR(2) models and recommend using all the 
available lags dated t-2 and earlier in order to obtain an efficient GMM estimator. 
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( ) 0=Δ− itsityE υ     for Tts ,...,4;2 =≥     (11) 
  ( ) 0=Δ− itsitxE υ       for Tts ,...,4;2 =≥       
 
The Arellano and Bond’s (1991) DIF-GMM procedure assumes a set of strict restrictions for the 
model to be valid: serial correlation in the first order errors and no second-order GMM residual 
serial correlation. Moreover, it recommends the Sargan statistics of overidentifying restrictions 
(also known as Hensen’s J) to tests the validity of the instrumental variables.  
 
Following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) we also employ the system 
GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator that was designed to overcome some of the limitations of the DIF-
GMM.6 The method involves the estimation of a system composed of equations in first differences 
and equations in levels where the additional internal instruments are both lagged levels and 
differences of the series (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In order to consider the additional moments as 
valid instruments for equation (10), the following additional moment conditions must be satisfied: 
 
 
( ) 02 =ΔΔ − itityE υ     for Tt ,...,4=      (12) 
( ) 02 =ΔΔ − ititxE υ       for Tt ,...,4=      
 
With the AR(2) model described in equation (10), a Granger causality test can be measured with a 
joint test of the two lags of efficiency and competition and is distributed as 2χ with two degrees of 
freedom. The null hypothesis is that the sum of the lagged coefficients is zero: if the probability is 
less than 0.10 then the null hypothesis that x Granger cause y is not rejected at the 10% significance 
level. The sign of the causal relationship is determined by the sum of the jointly significant 
coefficients. A positive (negative) sum implies that the causal relationship is also positive 
(negative), that is an increase (decrease) in x in the past increased (decreased) the y in the present.7 
 
                                                 
6 For example, where the series are highly persistent the lagged levels may be weak instruments for first differences 
(see e.g. Bond, 2002). 
7 While the Granger causality test is a useful tool to denote whether a variable is correlated with the lagged values of 
the other – after controlling for its own lags, some caution should be used in interpreting the results. Among the main 
limitations of the Granger are that it is contingent on the choice of variables included in the equations and the number of 
lags. Moreover, if the sample is unbalanced (as in our case) by increasing the number of lags, the number of 
observations will be reduced significantly and this may affect the consistency of the results.  
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Moreover we use an incremental Sargan/Hensen test for the validity of the additional moment 
restrictions described in (12) required by the SYS-GMM as follows: if S is the Sargan statistics 
obtained under stronger assumptions and S ′  is the Sargan statistics obtained under weaker 
assumptions, then the difference SS ′− , is asymptotically distributed as 2χ .  
 
Finally the estimated models are also subjected to a test that measures the stability over time (or 
‘long-run effect’) of the x over the y. The extant literature suggests the use of a test of the restriction 
021 =+ ββ  that should be interpreted as follows: a rejection of the restriction implies that there is 
evidence for a long-run effect of x on y. Else, y will depend on the change in x rather than on his 
level.8 
  
 
 
3.4 Data 
The data on EU commercial banks are derived from BankScope, a global database published by 
Bureau VanDjick. The data are collected for an unbalanced sample of 2,701 commercial bank 
observations operating in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom between 2000 and 
2005. We restricted the analysis to commercial banks as there are still significant differences in the 
retail market structure among countries and in some countries the saving banking sector is still 
partially benefiting from state help9. The choice of an unbalanced panel is justified mainly to 
account for mergers and acquisitions during the period. We use data from consolidated accounts, 
where available, to avoid double-counting. As a result, the banking market for country X is the 
defined as the hypothetical market where banks from country X operate and not the national borders 
of a country (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002). The data were analysed for inconsistencies, reporting 
errors, missing values and outliers. The final sample is shown in Table 1, which lists the total and 
average number of banks in the sample by country and year as well as the total average assets over 
the period.  
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
                                                 
8 For more details on this test see Bond and Windmeijer (2005). 
9 For example, until 2005 the German Landesbanks benefited state guarantees have secured the high ratings and have 
given them access to cheap funding.  
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It is interesting to note that Italian commercial banks have an average size that is roughly half that 
of the French, German and Spanish ones. Moreover, UK commercial banks have an average size of 
almost five times that of Italian banks. The number of banks in the sample is decreasing over time 
(with the exception of Italy) as the banking sector consolidates further.  
 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Competition Patterns in European Banking 
Table 2 shows the means of the structural indicators of market concentration across our sample of 
EU countries over the period 2000-2005. The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HH) represents the 
market share (in terms of total assets, total loans and total deposits) of every firm in the market 
whereas the CR-5 indicates the market share of the five largest firms in the market. We also 
calculated the HH for the sub-sample of commercial banks on Total Loans, Total Deposits as well 
as Total Assets. 
 
The data show that national conditions still vary considerably across countries and this is reflected 
in the different market structures of the retail banking industry in general and of the commercial 
banking industry in particular. Against the EU average (in 2005, HH was 601 and CR-5 was 43% 
for the EU-25), concentration levels remain relatively low in Germany, Italy and the UK. Most 
countries, however, show an increase in concentration during the period of analysis. In the UK 
alone, in the six years period from 2000 concentration (measured as the market share of the five 
largest banks) increased by 28.57%. Looking at the separate information for commercial banks, 
they seem to operate in more concentrated markets and this might be also reflected in their measure 
for market power. 
 
<Insert Table 2 around here> 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of marginal costs and of the Lerner index of monopoly power over the 
sample period and country differences are also apparent. The banking sector in the UK and 
Germany seem to enjoy the highest relative margin and Spain the lowest. These results are broadly 
in line with those of Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2005). 
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<Insert Figure 1 around here> 
 
 
Marginal costs decreased in all countries (with the exception of France) over the sample period, 
showing an increase in 2005. Italy and Spain, which display the highest average marginal costs, also 
display the biggest decrease, possibly because of the reduction of both financial costs and operating 
costs. Despite the decrease in marginal costs, Italy and Spain also display the highest increase in the 
Lerner Index, thus indicating that the decrease in marginal cost was smaller than the increase in the 
average price of assets. On the other hand, the Lerner Index decreases over the period in France and 
in the UK. Comparing our results with averages for the whole banking system (see Fernandez de 
Guevara and Maudos, 2005), they confirm that, despite being more concentrated, commercial banks 
enjoy a lower market power compared to saving banks. This reinforces our decision to concentrate 
this analysis on the commercial banking sector because of the potential distortions still existing in 
the EU saving banking sector. 
 
 
4.2 Competition Patterns in European Banking: H-statistic 
Following the empirical literature on competition in banking markets, we estimated the reduced 
form revenue equation specified in (2) using a panel data framework. The regression models are 
estimated using the fixed effect estimators. Estimations are carried out at each individual country 
level. 
 
<Insert Table 3 around here> 
 
Table 3 reports the regression results. The estimated H-statistic indicates monopolistic competition 
in all countries and ranges from 0.3715 in France to 0.7783 in Germany. As mentioned in Section 
3.1, under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand across markets, the model specification 
is consistent with a continuous interpretation of H and thus the comparison between countries is 
acceptable. Therefore, competition in the commercial banking sector seems the highest in Germany, 
Spain and the UK, followed by Italy and Spain. These results are consistent with the current 
literature, which finds the monopolistic competition the prevalent market structure in European 
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countries10 (see among others, Molyneux et al., 1994; De Bandt and Davies, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 
2002, Claessen and Laeven, 2004, Casu and Girardone, 2005). An analysis of the sign and 
significance of the regression coefficients (Table 3) indicates that both the price of funds and the 
price of labour are always positive and statistically significant for all countries in the sample. The 
impact of the cost of capital seems to be minimal compared to the other input prices (with the 
exception of UK and Germany). These results are again consistent with previous studies, which find 
that the impact of the capital factor input price varies by countries and it is the least important 
component of H (Molyneux et al., 1994; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). This might be due to the poor 
quality of capital expenses and fixed assets data. The variable TA (Total assets), which controls for 
the size of the bank and can be considered a proxy for scale economies, is also positive and 
statistically significant in all countries. The majority of the other bank-specific variables report 
mixed results. 
To validate our results, we conducted the equilibrium test for all the banking markets and found that 
the banking systems are in long-run equilibrium11. 
 
 
4. The evolution of bank efficiency: SFA and DEA analysis 
The yearly SFA and DEA results for the countries in our sample, as well as the average efficiency 
over the period are shown in Table 4. 
 
The average overall efficiency score for the five EU banking industries over the whole sample 
period is 75.43% for SFA and 71.23% for DEA, thus indicating a 24.57% and 28.77% respectively 
average potential reduction in inputs utilisation. The results for the different EU countries in 2005 
vary between 74.51% in Germany and 62.04% in Italy in the DEA estimations and between 80.47% 
in Italy and 68.88% in Spain for the SFA estimations. 
 
<Insert Table 4 around here> 
 
                                                 
10 F-Test results indicate that the both hypothesis H-stat = 0 (monopoly) and the hypothesis H-stat = 1 (perfect 
competition) are rejected in all countries. Therefore the hypothesis of 1<H<1 (monopolistic competition) holds in 
countries.  
11 The equilibrium test can be performed by recalculating the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistics replacing the dependent 
variable total revenue over assets with the natural log of return on assets (which is equal to net income over total assets), 
as shown in equation (2). The findings will be interpreted as follows: H<0 would indicate disequilibrium and H=0 
would indicate equilibrium (see Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux et al., 1994; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
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Both methodologies indicate and average inefficiency scores of about 30%, a result that is 
broadly in line with the main literature on bank efficiency (see Goddard et al., 2007).  Differently 
from most studies analysing bank efficiency during the 1990s, which find improvements in 
resources utilisation, the yearly results seem to indicate, for most countries, an increase in input 
wastage from 2000-2001 onwards (see Figure 2). This trend could be explained by the initial effort 
towards cutting costs fostered by deregulation and increased competition; the wave of mergers and 
acquisitions that followed might have imposed higher costs on banks, thereby decreasing their cost 
efficiency. However, decreases in bank efficiency can also be a signal that banks are struggling 
under excessive competition, with serious implications for the sector stability, or that they are 
reacting to competition by increased market power.  
<Insert Figure 2 around here> 
The analysis so far has highlighted that the main EU banking markets are becoming progressively 
more concentrated and less efficient. Furthermore, different measures of competition do not 
exclusively indicate an overall increase of competitive pressure over the period.  
The next section will investigate the relationship between efficiency and competition; particularly 
we study the direction of the causal relationship (if any) between the two variables. 
 
 
4.2 The Relationship and Causality between Competition and Efficiency  
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of our empirical analysis on the relationship and causality between 
competition and efficiency. These are derived from the estimation of cross-sectional pooled OLS 
regression models, fixed and random effects panels, the DIF-GMM robust estimators and the two-
step robust SYS-GMM model. Our specifications include two lags of the dependent and 
explanatory variables and they are carried out twice using as alternative measures of cost efficiency 
the parametric SFA and the non-parametric DEA (results are reported in panels (a) and (b) 
respectively).  
 
<Insert Table 5 around here> 
 
In the first set of estimations we test the causality from efficiency to competition (Table 5). 
Competition, measured as the Lerner index of monopoly power, is estimated as a function of lagged 
competition and lagged cost efficiency. Looking at the results, the first and second lags of 
 21
competition are usually significantly different from zero at the one per cent level in both panels (a) 
and (b). This indicates that competition at time t is influenced by previous years’ competition. 
Granger causality is assessed as the joint test of the two lags of efficiency on competition as 
follows: 021 == ββ . A p-value <0.10 rejects at the 10% significance level the null hypothesis that 
efficiency does not Granger-cause competition. However, following Arellano and Bond (1991), 
three additional conditions should be satisfied for the Granger causality to be statistically valid: a 
significant AR(1) serial correlation, lack of AR(2) serial correlation and a high Sargan/Hensen test 
statistics: a low p-value (<0.10) for this statistics indicates that the model is mispecified. Our 
findings in Table 5 suggest that in the majority of cases the Granger coefficient is negative, thereby 
indicating that cost efficiency negatively Granger-causes competition (i.e. an increase in bank 
efficiency Granger-causes a decrease in competition). The Granger coefficient is significant and the 
three additional conditions above are satisfied in at least three cases, particularly when lagged SFA 
efficiency measures are included as explanatory variables. The Granger causality test rejects the 
null of non-causality in the case of OLS estimation, random effects and two-step robust GMM 
estimators. Finally the long-run effect is significant only in one case in panel (b) therefore it is not 
possible to infer on the stability of the relationship between competition and efficiency over the 
long period. 
 
Table 6 shows the results for the causality running from competition to efficiency. The significance 
of the coefficients for the first and second lags of efficiency seem to suggest that efficiency is 
affected significantly by previous years’ efficiency (and in some cases the inefficiency as noted by 
the negative and significant sign of the second lag in panel a). Overall, the results seem to suggest 
that the Granger causality running from competition to efficiency is relatively weak. However, 
where significant, the sign of the Granger coefficient is positive.  
 
<Insert Table 6 around here> 
 
 
Overall, our results seem to provide some empirical evidence to support the existence of a cost 
efficiency-to-competition negative causation for our sample of European commercial banks. In 
other words, higher cost efficiency seems to cause a decrease in competition. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that more efficient banks are in a position to exploit market power and therefore 
there seem to be a trade-off between efficiency and competition. On the other hand it seems that the 
effect of competition on efficiency is less clear. These results seem to be consistent with the 
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“efficient structure hypothesis” whereby the best managed firms have the lowest costs and the 
largest market shares, which in turns leads to a higher degree of concentration. It seems therefore 
that efficiency determines competition, with a negative causality, whereas competition might 
stimulate managers to become more efficient, but the causality, although positive, is weak. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
Competition is generally considered as a positive force, often associated with increased efficiency 
and enhanced consumers’ welfare. However, in the banking sector it is a more controversial issue as 
regulators have historically been mindful of the trade-off between competition and stability.  The 
acceleration in the recent consolidation process, however, is raising concerns about increased 
concentration in the banking sector and its potential implications for public policy deriving from 
increased market power in the banking sector. Policymakers are faced with the contrasting issues as 
to whether competitive forces are posing a threat for the sector stability or whether the 
consolidation wave poses a threat to competition in the sector.  Using bank level balance sheet data 
for the major EU commercial banking markets, this paper aims to shed some light on the second 
issue by investigating the relationship between alternative measures of competition, concentration 
and bank-specific efficiency levels. Furthermore we use a dynamic panel data Granger causality test 
to investigate the dynamics of the relationship between competition and efficiency. Our findings 
suggest a negative causation between efficiency and competition, whereas the causality running 
from competition to efficiency, although positive, is relatively weak. These results pose further 
questions for competition policies. Recent decreases in bank efficiency could either be a signal that 
banks are struggling under excessive competition, with serious implications for the sector stability, 
or that they are reacting to competition by increased market power. The latter might seem a more 
likely explanation. However, as Vives (2001) pointed out, market power could be beneficial in 
banking as it provides incentives for banks to undertake less risky strategies. 
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Table 1 
Total Average Size of Sampled Banks and Number of Institutions 
 
 France Germany Italy Spain UK Total by year
2000 101 111 121 52 76 461
2001 105 107 130 56 70 468
2002 99 104 125 52 72 452
2003 93 104 144 47 78 466
2004 86 96 142 46 77 447
2005 77 89 135 39 67 407
Total number of banks 561 611 797 292 440 2,701
Total assets by country 
over the period (mil €) 22,708.0 24,657.5 11,690.6 22,938.6 49,947.2 
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Table 2 
Concentration Measures: Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HH) and CR-5 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2000-2005 
HH Total Loans  
(Commercial banks)               
France 1373 1443 1282 1271 849 1371 -0.14% 
Germany 1928 1956 1764 1635 2164 2010 4.27% 
Italy 987 872 945 646 564 1137 15.22% 
Spain 1890 2112 1606 2650 2309 3064 62.15% 
UK 924 917 1027 1085 1122 1084 17.29% 
HH Total Deposits (Commercial Banks)               
France 1374 1704 1427 1470 1417 1682 22.42% 
Germany 1872 1827 1774 1953 2781 2826 50.97% 
Italy 1138 992 974 742 730 1439 26.50% 
Spain 2016 2321 1713 2870 2328 3326 64.95% 
UK 935 955 1066 1116 1131 1327 41.88% 
HH Total Assets  
(Commercial Banks)               
France 1511 1957 1603 1669 1386 1622 7.34% 
Germany 1944 1933 1814 2019 2776 2833 45.72% 
Italy 1038 915 977 707 675 1315 26.71% 
Spain 2096 2466 1824 2992 2481 3459 65.02% 
UK 940 952 1080 1139 1164 1293 37.65% 
HH Total Assets  
(Banking Sector)               
France 587 606 551 597 623 758 29.13% 
Germany 151 158 163 173 178 174 15.23% 
Italy 190 260 270 240 230 230 21.05% 
Spain 581 532 513 506 482 487 -16.18% 
UK 264 282 307 347 376 399 51.14% 
CR-5  
(Banking Sector)               
France 47 47 45 47 50 53 12.77% 
Germany 20 20 21 22 22 22 10.00% 
Italy 23 29 31 28 26 27 17.39% 
Spain 46 44 44 43 42 42 -8.70% 
UK 28 29 30 33 35 36 28.57% 
Source: Authors’ calculations and ECB (2006). 
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Table 3 
H Statistics Resultsa,b,c 
 
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN UK    Countries    
 
Variables      
P1 0.0854** 0.3222*** 0.2668*** 0.3714*** 0.2563*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0353) (0.0234) (0.0434) (0.0339) 
P2 0.2851*** 0.4142*** 0.2858*** 0.3438*** 0.4521*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0189) (-0.0120) (-0.0239) (0.0166) 
P3 0.0011 0.0418** -0.0131 0.0207 0.0349** 
 (0.0169) (0.0122) (-0.0071) (-0.0236) (0.0110) 
EQAST -0.0846* 0.0570* 0.0723** -0.1340*** 0.1194** 
 (0.0336) (0.0261) (0.0249) (0.0348) (0.0364) 
TA 0.7569*** 1.0558*** 0.8599*** 0.8979*** 1.0197*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0291) (0.0204) (-0.0427) (-0.0298) 
LOANAST -0.0085 0.0800*** 0.0382* 0.0248 0.0219 
 (0.0252) (0.0176) (-0.0171) (-0.0340) (-0.0191) 
DEPOS 0.0691 0.1968 0.0384 0.4083 -0.3354* 
 (-0.1125) (-0.3363) (-0.1014) (-0.4906) (-0.1382) 
OBSTA 0.0114 0.0043 -0.0120 -0.0033 0.0003 
 (-0.0150) (-0.0015) (-0.0080) (-0.0101) (-0.0083) 
CONS 0.0309 -0.0202 0.6095*** 0.5652* 0.7307 
 (-0.2045) (-0.1403) (0.1118) (-0.2251) (-0.1845) 
      
H statistic 0.3715*** 0.7783*** 0.5395*** 0.7359*** 0.7433 
      
F test 
(Hstat=0) 119.14 331.25 389.33 197.35 355.90 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
F test 
(Hstat=1) 340.96 26.89 283.56 25.43 42.43 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      
Market in 
equilibrium Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
a Standard errors in brackets. 
b P1 = average cost of labour, P2 = average cost of deposits, P3 = average cost of capital, EQAST= equity/assets, 
TA = total assets, LOANAST= loans/assets, DEPOS= deposits/deposits + money market funding, OBSTA = OBS 
activities/assets, CONS = constant term.  
With the exception of factor prices all variables are expressed in logs. 
c  *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 4 
DEA and SFA Efficiency Scores by Year and Country 
 
 
 
 
Countries 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000- 2005 
France 69.46 67.29 65.59 65.57 3.69 62.39 -10.17% 
Germany 72.29 73.33 69.45 68.73 70.50 74.51 3.07% 
Italy 76.33 83.71 65.31 63.81 77.49 62.04 -18.72% 
Spain 84.67 80.11 79.47 72.20 7520 78.64 -7.13% 
UK 72.12 76.28 62.78 69.62 66.71 67.63 -6.23% 
Average 74.97 76.14 68.52 67.98 70.12 69.04 -7.91% 
 
DEA 
Efficiency 
Scores 
  
 
   
  
 
France 74.10 73.83 71.17 71.86 70.23 69.75 -5.87% 
Germany 74.77 74.13 73.76 72.09 71.34 70.85 -5.25% 
Italy 84.13 83.35 81.42 81.17 80.57 80.47 -4.35% 
Spain 75.19 73.32 71.77 72.20 71.51 68.88 -8.40% 
UK 76.95 75.46 74.15 73.48 72.53 70.54 -8.33% 
 
SFA 
Efficiency 
Scores 
Average 77.03 76.02 74.45 74.16 73.23 72.10 -6.40% 
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Table 5 
Does Cost Efficiency Granger-Cause Competition? 
 
Dependent variable 
y= 
LERNER INDEX 
Variables and tests OLS levels Fixed 
Effects 
 Random 
Effects 
DIF-GMM 
t-2 
Robust 
Two-step  
SYS-GMM 
Robust  
LER1 .8832*** 
(.0339) 
.2027*** 
(.0283) 
.7658*** 
(.0232) 
.4651*** 
(.2002) 
.7217*** 
(.1437) 
LER2 .0602* 
(.0324) 
-.0940*** 
(.0279) 
.1163*** 
(.0225) 
.0037 
(.0488) 
.1233 
(.1397) 
SFAEFF1 .0003 
(.0004) 
-.0016 
(.0058) 
.0002 
(.0006) 
-.0081 
(.0067) 
.0002 
(.0005) 
SFAEFF2 -.0003 
(.0004) 
.0014 
(.0059) 
-.0002 
(.0007) 
.0079 
(.0068) 
-.0002 
(.0005) 
m1 p-value .3485 n/a n/a .046 .085 
m2 p-value n/a n/a n/a .956 .727 
Sargan/Hensen p-
value 
n/a n/a n/a .300 .577 
Granger coefficient -.0000 -.0002 -.000 -.00012 -.0000 
Granger causality p-
value 
.5537 .0519* .9299 .0916* .9197 
Difference 
Sargan/Hensen 
    0.99 
(a) x = SFA cost 
efficiency 
Test of β1+ β2=0 p-
value 
.393 .113 .717 .346 .800 
LER1 .8839*** 
(.040) 
.2058*** 
 (.0282) 
.7684***  
(.0232) 
.5722**   
(.2353) 
.5758*** 
(.2782) 
LER2 .0588**    
(.0325) 
-.1038*** 
 (.0279) 
.1147*** 
(.0225) 
  -.00099   
(.0494) 
.2940 
(.2712) 
DEAEFF1 -.0004   
(.0004) 
.00023 
(.0004) 
-.00041 
(.0004) 
.00142 
(.0016) 
.00034    
(.0005) 
DEAEFF2 .0002 
(.0004) 
.0006*** 
(.0004) 
.0002   
(.0004) 
.00094 
(.0007) 
.0004  
(.0005) 
m1 p-value .334 n/a n/a .045 .477 
m2 p-value n/a n/a n/a .956 .413 
Sargan/Hensen p-
value 
n/a n/a n/a .201 .853 
Granger coefficient -.00019 .0009 -.0002 .0024 .0007 
Granger causality p-
value 
.4341 .203 .493 .4032 .632 
Difference 
Sargan/Hensen 
    0.599 
(b) x= DEA cost 
efficiency 
Test of β1+ β2=0 p-
value 
.324 .116   .472    .27 .342     
Note: Year dummies are included in all models. OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; DIF-GMM= difference GMM. SYS-
GMM = system GMM. SFAEFF= cost efficiency estimated using SFA. DEAEFF= cost efficiency estimated using 
DEA. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in parentheses. Huber-
White standard errors are computed for one-step estimates while the two-step estimates are Windmeijeier corrected. m1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. Sargan/Hensen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions for the GMM estimators. All computations done using Stata. 
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Table 6 
Does Competition Granger-Cause Cost Efficiency? 
 
Dependent 
variable y:  
COST 
EFFICIENCY  
Variables and tests  OLS levels Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
DIF-GMM 
t-2 
Robust 
Two-step  
SYS-GMM 
Robust 
SFAEFF1 2.088*** 
(.0022) 
2.0764*** 
(.0004) 
2.0837*** 
(.0003) 
2.0738*** 
(.0019) 
2.0875*** 
(.0036) 
SFAEFF2 -1.090*** 
(.0023) 
-1.079*** 
(.0004) 
-1.0858 *** 
(.0004) 
-1.0759*** 
(.0019) 
-1.0897*** 
(.0037) 
LER1 .01280 
(.0093) 
-.0008 
(.0019) 
-.0021 
(.0024) 
.0008 
(.0151 ) 
.0006 
(.0048) 
LER2 -.0141 
(.0100) 
.0066*** 
(.0019) 
.0034 
(.0024) 
.0049*** 
(.0028) 
-.0066*** 
(.0036) 
Serial correlation 
(AR1) p-value 
.0000 n/a n/a .000 .001 
Serial Correlation 
(AR2) p-value 
n/a n/a n/a .000 .002 
Sargan/Hensen p-
value 
n/a n/a n/a .449 .841 
Granger coefficient -.0013 .0058 .0013 .0057 -.0059 
Granger causality p-
value 
.2206 .0017** .330 .1998 .1565 
Difference 
Sargan/Hensen 
    0.163 
 (a) x = SFA cost 
efficiency 
 
Test of β1+ β2=0 p-
value 
.911 .011 .660 .722 .205 
DEAEFF1 .6711*** 
(.0378) 
.0456*** 
(.0381) 
.6017*** 
(.028) 
.5400*** 
(.2026) 
.7783** 
(.4121) 
DEAEFF2 .1721*** 
(.0376) 
-.1146 
(.0348) 
.1855*** 
(.028) 
.0944 
(.0707) 
.4717 
(.4275) 
LER1 3.9751 
(2.5051) 
4.4103* 
(2.5743) 
4.221** 
(1.8137) 
-36.8735 
(31.7019) 
2.3988 
(2.7498) 
LER2 .0295 
(2.6762) 
-.1967 
(2.5451) 
-.1512 
(1.7705) 
-6.5340 
(5.2405) 
2.2130 
(3.6485) 
Serial correlation 
(AR1) p-value 
.497 n/a n/a .003 .590 
Serial Correlation 
(AR2) p-value 
n/a n/a n/a .151 .401 
Sargan/Hensen p-
value 
n/a n/a n/a .000 .201 
Granger coefficient 4.005*** 4.2136 4.070*** -43.4075 4.6118 
Granger causality p-
value 
.001 .2143 .001 .4060 .4521 
Difference 
Sargan/Hensen 
    0.011 
 (b) x = DEA 
cost efficiency  
Test of β1+ β2=0 p-
value 
.000 .1750 .000 .217 .232 
Note: Year dummies are included in all models. OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; DIF-GMM= difference GMM. SYS-
GMM = system GMM. SFAEFF= cost efficiency estimated using SFA. DEAEFF= cost efficiency estimated using 
DEA. *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in parentheses. Huber-
White standard errors are computed for one-step estimates while the two-step estimates are Windmeijeier corrected. m1 
and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. Sargan/Hensen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions for the GMM estimators. All computations done using Stata. 
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Figure 1 
Marginal Cost and Lerner Index of Monopoly Power 
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Figure 2 
DEA and SFA Yearly Averages 
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